THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH IN COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY
G. Thines 1. Statement of the problem.
As has been the case for quite a number of words used in psychology to define a field of reflection or research, comparative psychology has been used with many different meanings. In his dictionary of psychological terms, Harriman (1947) refers to it as "the division of psychology concerned with likeness and differences in the behavior of various lower organisms."
The same author then goes back to Aristotle for the first foundation of the field and then jumps to the work of Darwin and Thorndike to explain the biological and decidedly behavioral aspects of modern comparative psychology.
In his well-known Vocabulaire de la psychologie, Pieron gives a more extensive meaning to the term. According to him, comparative psychology includes animal psychology (which he prefers to call zoological psychology), developmental psychology, ethnical psychology and finally differential psychology.
In other words, if these definitions are to be taken literally, one can speak of comparative psychology whenever differences are the main topic.
It is nevertheless certain that the study of differences has no unequivocal sense for lower organisms on the one hand, and for human subjects on the other hand. Here again, psychological concepts suffer from a lack of epistemological analysis and from a crude acceptance of methodological principles based on the possibility of measurement as such.
It is noteworthy that the proposed divisions are exclusively based on intuitive discriminations, and not on quantitative criteria allowing a firm classification of levels of behavior. Thus, the striving for quantification cannot claim, at least in the case under discussion, to be anything other than a striving, i.e., a vague desire to speak and to act scientifically, despite the implications this fact may have for the discrepancies existing between the ideal of the scientist and the concrete object of his investigations.
The limits of numerical treatment
Another source of confusion in the field of comparative psychology is to be found in the misuse of statistical procedures. To be sure, statistical treatments in psychology and in the other human sciences do not amount simply to a referral to statistical methods; they imply on the contrary the acceptance of a definite mode of thinking.
In defining the "normal" subject for instance, it is classical to assume that such a subject is the subject liable to be placed within a certain numerical dispersion around the mean value of quantitative measurements obtained on a homogenous population. Once again, if there is no objection to treating in that way the dispersion of flatworms or beetles in a lighted tube around the theoretical centre of gravity (calculated as the mean zone of a praeferendum, as many experimenters unceasingly did in studying photokinesis), one can seriously doubt that the same principle of numerical treatment can be applied to various aspects of the individual or social behavior of human subjects.
In trying to obtain a sufficiently sound definition, or even description, of the normal subject, one can immediately remark that the word "normal" calls for an implicit conception of the "representative" subject, which is not thoroughly solved by admitting that representativeness is adequately expressed by statistical significance.
It must be noted that in common language, the representative man is precisely the exceptional man, in other words the least fitting in the statistical distribution of a group, but the most fitting in a certain frame of culture promoting a particular intuitive model of human success.
